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Abstract &squf; The present era of ’flexible accumulation’ and crisis is widely seen to
have engendered distinctive changes in the labour process. The analysis pre-
sented here explores the ways in which these transformations are experienced
and absorbed by hourly wage workers at an aluminium plant in the United States.
Of particular interest are the distinct meanings the workers attach to different
managerial innovations; thus, the reordering of shift arrangements provokes
worker response (and union action) that is quite different from the reaction
inspired by the introduction of cooperative worker-management teams at the
plant. Using classical Marxian analytical categories, it may be said that the
current regimen of workplace control involves some combination of absolute
and relative surplus value strategies. By disaggregating this mix of strategies,
these workers’ narratives help cast some light on the currently raging debate
about whether or not we are living in an age of globalization and epochal change.
Keywords &squf; capitalism &squf; globalization &squf; labour &squf; management &squf; Marxian econ-
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Ethnography as a method has much to contribute to our understanding of
the ways in which the recent period of capitalist restructuring has trans-
formed the labour process and refashioned labour politics. This article
offers a view of how global shifts in the character of work are experienced
in one location by analyzing a series of conversations with hourly wage
workers at an Alcoa (Aluminium Company of America) manufacturing
facility in southern Indiana. The discussion will focus on certain manage-
ment practices that were being instituted at the time - allegedly to enhance
the company’s competitiveness in the world market - which were the source
of a great deal of concern to Alcoa employees. The two managerial inno-
vations that were debated most frequently by the workers were: first, the
decision to generalize the application of the drop/rotating shift through-
out the plant (so far, these work schedules had been in effect in a few
departments), and the new constellation of workplace relationships that
accompanied the introduction of the ’Total Quality Control’ system.
The Alcoa plant in Indiana produces giant coils of metal which are then
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shipped to the company’s customers for use in the manufacture of alu-
minium beverage cans. It is a unionized workplace, and the workers that I
spoke to fit the picture of what remains of traditional organized labour in
this country: mostly white, mostly male, employed by a transnational cor-
poration to carry out heavy industrial work based on classic Fordist tech-
niques of production, increasingly driven against the wall in an era of
de-industrialization and anti-union legislation.
The analysis presented here will consider the perceptions of these
workers regarding the changes in their work lives, and the kinds of assump-
tions that underlie these perceptions. Based as it is on these narratives
rather than on any examination of macroeconomic data regarding the pro-
cesses they were referring to, the article cannot make claims about the sig-
nificance or direction of the transformations in present-day capitalism.
Thus, the ethnographic means employed here may not resolve the issue of
whether or not these transformations can legitimately be termed ’globaliz-
ation’, a question that is insistently being debated among a section of the
American Left (Du Boff and Herman, 1997; Henwood, 1997; Piven and
Cloward, 1998a, 1998b; Sivanandan, 1997; Tabb, 1997a,1997b; Wood,1996,
1997a, 1997b, 1997c, 1998). However, such a perspective makes it possible
to learn something about how particular dimensions of change are experi-
enced and to speculate about why they might be so experienced. The
assumptions and perceptions contained in these workers’ narratives lead on
to everyday resistances or everyday accommodations: historical change, it
must be remembered, is attributable not only to large-scale processes, but
is also coloured by such subaltern decisions.
The Alcoa workers usually managed to ground their discussion of these
two managerial innovations within an understanding of the historical
relationship between themselves and ’corporate America’. Their analysis of
this relationship will emerge as we begin to look at their narratives. Before
delving into these, however, it might be useful to review some of the
premises of the literature on the changing character of labour control
(Braverman, 1974; Burawoy, 1979a, 1979b; Edwards, 1979; Gutman, 1977;
Montgomery, 1979, 1987). The social organization of the labour process in
the United States is generally understood to have been shaped by the
changing course of American capitalism in the 20th century. Most labour
historians agree that the larger dynamics of the system - such as the rise of
the large corporation, the growth of unions, periodic capitalist crises and
the intervention of the state - have affected the nature of class struggle, and
hence of workplace hierarchy.
When Frederick Taylor first published his ideas regarding scientific
management at the start of the century, many American capitalists immedi-
ately tried to impose these routines on industrial workers. Scientific manage-
ment proceeded by fragmenting work tasks to their simplest component
parts and then assigning them to different workers to perform over and over
again, paced according to unrelenting standards set by time-and-motion
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studies. The resultant ’separation of conception from execution’ (Braver-
man, 1974) led to the erosion of workers’ traditional crafts skills and know-
ledge, and Taylorist supervision frequently generated fierce worker
resistance. Corporations quickly learnt that hierarchical forms of labour
control were ineffective if they were seen to be purely repressive; for
instance, much before Taylorism, the Pullman strike of 1894 was seen to be
directly related to the degree of control enjoyed by foremen over workers,
in addition to wage issues. This led to the birth of the era of welfare capital-
ism, whereby betterment programmes were initiated by several major cor-
porations while the needs of workers for the reduction of Taylorite work
speed-up and reasonable supervision remained unmet. Thus, in 1914, Ford
experimented with the $5, eight-hour day for his assembly-line workers,
while Rockefeller, after the Ludlow clashes between miners and the
National Guard that took place in the same year, tinkered with ’industrial
democracy’, offering wage guarantees and fringe benefits, and rigidly
defined grievance and appeals procedures. Fordism and Taylorism were not
always strictly conjoined: it has been noted that scientific management was
frequently eschewed by companies since it would have been at odds with the
impression of welfarism that they were trying hard to project (Edwards,
1979). The Human Relations school was the true theoretical counterpart to
this form of capitalist practice, with its themes of workplace harmony and
cooperation.
The efficacy of company unions and welfare capitalism plummeted
during the harsh decade of the 1930s, as corporations were forced to renege
on their promises of relatively high wages and job security. As labour activism
grew, there was a shift towards more structural forms of control, where
’rather than being exercised openly by the foreman, or supervisor, power
was made invisible in the structure of work’ (Edwards, 1979: 110). This could
take the previously tried form of technical control, where the control
mechanism was embedded in the technological structure of the firm, as in
the widespread application of continuous-flow production. It could also
manifest itself, however, as bureaucratic control: the ’managerial revolution’
of the modern corporation. Fully honed only in the post-Second World War
era, bureaucratic control establishes company policy as the basis for control,
defines career trajectories for workers and management cadres, and insti-
tutionalizes the exercise of hierarchical power within the corporation.
Although particular strategies of labour control are associated with
specific time periods, corporations have always used a mix of the
approaches known at the time. Successive strategies may be tried and dis-
carded, but they often leave a lasting imprint upon managerial practice.
The workers’ narratives presented in this article are centred around two
managerial innovations which bear an unmistakable resemblance to
bureaucratic control. As we shall see, however, there are also elements of
older, atavistic forms of labour control that can be discerned in both new
policies.
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At the Alcoa plant in question, nearly 4000 employees come to work in
three different shifts to keep the plant functioning 24 hours a day all
through the year. A change in work schedules that has provoked much dis-
cussion among Alcoa workers has been the extension of the drop shift (also
called the rotating shift) to various departments throughout the plant. The
introduction of the drop shift prolongs the working day for the affected
workers by eliminating the idea of the work week. Without a work week, the
category of overtime work has been done away with, along with the possi-
bility of overtime pay.
The new system works in the following manner: most Alcoa workers
now go to work for 12 hours at a time, instead of the 8-hour ’straight’ shifts
of the past. Previously, there was a sharp distinction between the work week
and the weekend, established as a result of past union struggles for a five-
day week. The weekend was an off-duty ’own’ time for the workers, and as
such, commanded a higher price than the ordinary work week in the form
of overtime compensation. This is no longer the case: workers are paid the
same fixed wage for whatever day of the week they are scheduled to come
in to work. Although the number of actual hours they work per month has
not increased at all, the elimination of the work week substantially increases
the number of work hours at regular pay that the company now has at its
disposal. Finally, these 12-hour shifts that may span any of the seven days of
the week are clumped together in a manner such that each worker is peri-
odically left with a substantial block of ’off’ days. The company has had to
come up with a rather complicated arrangement of shift duration and rotat-
ing pattern in order to avoid violating various legal stipulations relating to
maximum number of working hours, overtime payments and payments of
night differentials.
An Alcoa employee explained his new working hours to me in the
following manner:
I work four days, then off two; four, and then off three; four, and off seven.
Every month you get seven straight days off. You work 12 hours out of 24 hours,
you work 12 days out of 24. If you work a whole year, you only work six months.
Although it is by no means the universal reaction to these changes, they are
usually experienced by the affected workers as unfair working conditions.
One of the most vehement critics of the drop shift at Alcoa expressed his
opposition to the new system in these terms:
They’re taking away the Monday-through-Friday jobs and putting the guys on
some kind of an alternate shift, to where they work all night. I have a theory
about this.
I used to make a great living working Monday through Friday. When I wanted
to make extra money - to go to Florida, Disney World, to trade cars or buy a
new refrigerator - I could work weekends. That option was always there. I had
a great life, made good money. I done things that upper middle-class people
done, the guys that could go to Florida and stay in a big motel. Hell, I could go
anywhere. I made good enough money to do that.
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Okay. Alcoa sends you all this literature saying you’re an Alcoan and we’re
glad to have you in the Alcoa family and all that stuff. See, this brainwash type
thing. Then they put you on these drop shifts. You’re working the weekend.
You get one weekend a month off.
You don’t go to your family reunions no more. Because you’ve got to work
that weekend. Society’s not going to plan everything around one weekend. The
whole American society of playing is on the weekend. All your major baseball
games, basketball games, football games is on the weekend. You have your
weddings on the weekend, you have your family reunions on the weekend, you
have your fish fries down at the river on the weekend. Everything is geared
around the weekend in American society.
It gets to the point where your friends and people don’t ask you no more,
because you’re working. They call and say Donnie you want to come to the fish
fry this weekend? Man, I can’t, I’ve got to work this weekend. It gets to the point
- and it’s happened to us - it gets to the point that they quit asking you, because
you keep turning them down.
So what do you do? Alcoa’s got you. What do you turn to when that happens?
You turn to Alcoa; it’s your whole life. And I really think these people sit back
and think about things like that. If they can get you married to Alcoa, you are
going to be a happy Alcoan. You’re sold to them, you know.
He is raising two separate issues here: in the first place, the small degree of
control that the individual Alcoa employee may have had over the amount
of income that they could expect to make has been lost. This has clearly
been a serious financial loss for many workers. The second issue is poten-
tially more complicated and ambiguous, hinging on ideas of the relation-
ship between work time and leisure time, and ultimately on the perception
of time itself.1 Thus, for exactly the same reasons that he condemns the
drop shift, it could conceivably hold a great deal of appeal for many other
Alcoa employees. As this same worker admits:
You work a whole year, you get six months off. That’s what people are looking
at. If you throw in your vacation time - and most guys get about five weeks off
- you’re only going to work four months and three weeks. That’s what most
people are looking at.
Judging from the collective response of the workers at this plant, that in
fact, was not what most people were looking at. The actions taken by the
union against these work schedules seem to imply that the majority of Alcoa
workers were opposed to these shift changes. At the previous contract nego-
tiations, there had been a bitter three-month strike. All other issues were
resolved in a month and a half, but the union voted to stay on strike against
the generalized application of drop shifts at the plant for another six weeks
before giving up. Nearly every worker I spoke to predicted that the drop
shift would be a key issue at the next contract talks.
The only individuals I met who seemed to regard the drop shift appre-
ciatively were those who had never experienced the luxury of a five-day
work week (in a very few departments at the plant, workers had always been
scheduled to work for regular pay over weekends). One worker who had
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spent many years doing the hot and arduous work of setting metal in the
plant’s potrooms felt that he had benefited from the wider application of
the drop shift.
Most of them people was on straight shifts. For years and years, some people
worked seven days a week for a whole year at a time and they made a lot of
dollars. Then they cut a lot of overtime out, they put them on drop shifts, which
... 
it created more jobs too, which is good. Like the department I’m in now,
they created rotating shifts in it, and it created jobs that got me into that depart-
ment. Which, if it wasn’t for rotating shift, I wouldn’t have been here, you know.
He went on to say, however, that some of these other workers had their
incomes slashed by as much as $8,000 to $10,000 per year with the intro-
duction of the drop shift, and that he could well understand their opposi-
tion to it. It is probably safe to say that, on the whole, individual workers’
attitudes on the rotating shift were dictated by its immediate impact on
their own lives, and that this impact was a financially adverse one for the
majority of Alcoa employees.
In the language of Marxian political economy, the reorganization of
shift arrangements that has been adopted at this plant may be best concep-
tualized as the latest move in the history of the attempts to increase absol-
ute surplus value. This basically is a matter of extending the working day
relative to the wage required to guarantee working-class reproduction.2 This
was done during the first Industrial Revolution by increasing the number of
hours that factory workers would have to work each day. As described in the
chapter on the length of the working day in Capital, this was an important
site for struggle in the 19th century; and ultimately, social limits were set that
would determine just how far such a process could go (Marx, 1977). A few
decades later, the speed-up that accompanied the establishment of Fordist
techniques also effectively led to the prolongation of the working day. Again,
it was resisted; there were phenomenally high turnover rates at the places
where this was instituted (Braverman, 1974). Gramsci’s discussion of the
’psycho-physical reorientation’ of European workers that was required by
the processes of Fordism and Americanism points to the resistance to these
techniques when they were transported to Europe (Gramsci, 1971). At Alcoa,
without a work week, overtime work becomes obsolete, not to mention over-
time pay. For the corporation, this negation of the idea of the work week
does represent a surge in absolute surplus value. Again, the new policy
becomes a site for battle: in much the same way that earlier attempts to step
up the absolute surplus value had been greeted by workers in the past, the
workers at Alcoa seemed determined to challenge these changes.
In spite of all the differences between those who were affected by the
new work schedules and those who were not, there was noticeably greater
clarity and agreement among workers on the subject of the drop shift as
compared to the ambivalence they expressed towards the company-spon-
sored Total Quality Control (TQC) system. The TQC system involved the
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setting up of a number of cooperative teams comprising management and
blue-collar workers which were to be responsible for operations in their part
of the plant. Workers were to share ideas about improving shop-floor per-
formance with their management team-mates, and it was thought that a
certain amount of workplace conflict would be resolved at the level of the
team instead of requiring standard union-mediated grievance processes. A
good deal of emphasis was placed on courteous and respectful behaviour
between team-mates. Constant improvement in the quality of production
was held up as the ultimate goal of the cooperative teams. Observers have
noted that the ’team concept’ - the general term for such schemes, used
in the American auto industry where this form of labour control was first
introduced (Parker and Slaughter, 1988) - displaces unions by fostering the
illusion of worker participation in management. The Alcoa workers’ col-
lective response to the proposal was positive; the union, in fact, voted to
accept the system while I was conducting these interviews. Individual
workers’ responses, however, seemed far less clear.
The TQC system at Alcoa seems designed to fit in with the classic de-
scriptions of the just-in-time’ production techniques that are seen by many
writers to be replacing the earlier Fordist phase of capitalism. To recapitu-
late David Harvey’s description of the production process that character-
izes this transition:3 there is a shift away from the uniformity and
standardization of the Fordist era, and towards flexible and small-batch pro-
duction of a variety of product types (Harvey, 1989). In contrast to the large
inventory holdings of the past, production is undertaken in limited quan-
tities on a just-in-time’ basis, and quality control becomes part of the
process. The immediate detection and rectification of errors prevents the
loss of production time that was common under the cumbersome older
system of maintaining huge buffer stocks that concealed defects and errors
until the last stages. Instead of the earlier emphasis on cost reduction
through wage control, the new production process tries to cut costs by
incorporating learning-by-doing in long-term planning. In terms of the
labour process, this translates into an emphasis on ’on the job’ learning and
workers’ co-responsibility, in place of the earlier stress on discipline and ver-
tical hierarchy. Alcoa’s TQC system is clearly a form of workplace control
that is aimed at adapting to these new conditions.
In their pioneering study of the team concept, Parker and Slaughter
list a number of features that characterize this style of industrial manage-
ment (Parker and Slaughter, 1988; see also Parker and Slaughter, 1994).
One of the basic moves made in a team concept contract is to establish the
interchangeability of workers and the abolition of job classifications, which
undermines the hard-won principle of seniority as the basis for advance-
ment and transfer within a production unit. Also, every step of every job is
defined in detail, and the smallest component portion of each job is
assigned to each worker. This is the familiar strategy termed ’deskilling’ by
Braverman, which gives management greater control over the way jobs are
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done (Braverman, 1974). Deskilling was an essential component of the first
round of Taylorism; and the team concept represents an intensified form
of Taylorism, different only in that corporations are now able to obtain
union cooperation in the use of this method of labour control (Parker and
Slaughter, 1988). The rhetoric of management-worker teamwork, osten-
sibly over issues of quality and safety, creates the conditions for workers to
participate in increasing their own workload. Again, within these joint
worker-management teams, workers may find themselves saddled with
responsibility for jobs previously done by supervisors, without a concomi-
tant increase in authority. The real casualty in this new set of workplace
relationships is the process of collective bargaining. As the labour force
slides in the direction of enterprise unionism, the union may begin to con-
ceive of itself as a partner of management.
When asked what they thought about the TQC system, workers’
responses varied greatly.
I see nothin’ wrong with it. I know a lot of your hardnosed union people,
they’re a hundred percent against it. I think it’s good thing if company and
union talk together, they might be able to talk things out a bit. I see nothin’
wrong with it. I think it’s a good opportunity.
In fact, the ’hardnosed union people’ did not come across as being a
hundred percent against TQC. It seemed to me that Alcoa workers, regard-
less of their relationship to the union, tried to make sense of these new
management practices (and particularly of TQC) before a discursive back-
drop of external threat to their employers and themselves. There was a dis-
tinct tendency to identify their own best interests with the continued
competitiveness of the company in the world market, and workers often
expressed the opinion that any objections to the compromises and aus-
terities demanded by Alcoa in these tough times were basically shortsighted.
’There is nothing to be gained’, in the words of one strong union supporter,
’by attacking the company when it is down.’ These sentiments were voiced
with considerably greater frequency and assurance when talking about TQC
rather than the drop shift; perhaps because the drop shift was recognized
more readily as an instance of stepped-up exploitation.
Discussions of TQC appeared to revolve around an immobilizingly
powerful conception of what has come to be labelled ’globalization’ in both
academic and media contexts. If by globalization, we mean an ’emphasis on
runaway shops and the threat of low wage production venues in the Third
World to American workers’ (Tabb, 1997a: 21), it was an idea that surfaced
repeatedly as workers tried to unravel the meaning of these innovations in
labour control. Again, the notion of Japan’ frequently set the terms for the
Alcoa workers’ discussions of TQC. I think it would be hard to identify an
individual who did not voice their concern about Japanese competition to
me at one point or another. As illustrated by the following quote from one
of the workers, the anxiety seems focused on several distinct world regions.
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Germany, we’re going to have a juggernaut here. Those people are pretty
mechanically minded, they’re pretty industrious. United Europe, to me, is
where ... I’m just wondering what’s going to come out of united Europe. Are
we going to go down another notch or two, or something like that? Where’re
we going with our markets and everything? Who’s going to need the cans,
y’know?
A union official, even as he ruminated over the significance of international
capitalist competition in the formation of new strategies of labour control
such as TQC, lapsed repeatedly into TQC-speak, perhaps as an overflow
from the company’s own literature on TQC4 which also makes its case
against the backdrop of the threat of foreign competition. After recount-
ing the saga of the fall of the house of American labour from the time that
President Ronald Reagan first assumed office and broke the back of the air
traffic controllers’ strike, he went on to say:
Companies really enjoyed that success for a number of years, not realizing that
what was happening at the time when they was being so greedy and not putting
together a quality product, be it the motor companies, or aluminum, or
anywhere. What they didn’t realize was that foreign countries was eating their
lunch by making a good quality product.
The upshot of his analysis seems to be that American corporations have not
been terribly far-thinking in recent times and that it is now up to the labour-
ing classes to bail them out.
I think today the government and the corporations has put the country in a sad
shape. But rather than set and just worry about that, working class people today
- as always, it’s fell back on their shoulders also ... What I see from the job I
do now is that we no longer can afford to think we have a continuous battle
between the union and the company, daily, fighting. What we’re goin’ to have
to do is we’re going to have to realize that, as workers, we’re going to have to
make a quality product and make sure, to protect our jobs, that the companies
really care about quality themselves. It’s very competitive, and we’re all going
to have to operate a little bit different. Or our children ... our children’s not
going to have any future at all in this country.
As in many conversations about TQC with Alcoa workers, ambivalence
strikes unexpectedly, and this union official suddenly shows himself to be
unconvinced by his own earlier arguments about the importance of build-
ing quality products. Lamenting the death of working-class radicalism, he
portrays TQC as company policy that the union is powerless to resist.
One of the reasons that I think you have to play the cards you’re dealt today,
as a labor leader, is because the dream of attacking government officials that’s
not out for the American people, working-class people, and attacking the
companies, that dream will not come true until people, I’m afraid, reach rock
bottom ... I have travelled some and I’ve spent my hours in the field hollering
solidarity and trying to get the labour movement to really get on the move, but
it’s very hard today to get people to give you even five minutes of their time
after work to talk about things we need to do for our children and for ourselves.
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So we’re going to have to hit rock bottom. Until then it’s back again, you play
the cards that’s dealt.
From within a local union that had clearly endorsed the TQC system, I
heard doubts expressed over and over again. One worker worried that TQC
would ultimately lead to Taylorite work speed-up: ’I’m very reluctant at
times for these teams to do stuff. Maybe we’ll get things too strenuous.’ As
Parker and Slaughter have demonstrated, using case studies of industrial
plants from all over the United States, such fears are far from groundless
(Parker and Slaughter, 1988, 1994).
Yet another worker voiced the most poignant fear of all, the fear that
despite steadfast worker efforts to conform to these new management prac-
tices, the corporations will still desert the American working class and take
their jobs overseas.
They want us to be involved in these team projects. Yet they’re doing everything
in the world, as far as I’m concerned, to hurt me ... You know the football
coach Lou Holtz out at Notre Dame, and they put a film on, you know, and
he’s a very good motivator, I like what he does. I enjoyed it, I did, but I said
hell you’re showing this to the wrong man, don’t show it to me. Show it to these
guys that’s making these deals overseas. Don’t show it to me; I’m ready. Get the
commitment from them people.
It may be useful to conceive of this form of labour control as an attempt
to raise relative surplus value, which is achieved not by the prolongation of
labour time at a fixed wage level, nor by a reduction in wages, but through
the intensification of a constant quantity of labour (or labour time). From
Alcoa’s standpoint, TQC represented an effort to raise labour productivity,
unlike the drop shift, which was a circuitous strategy for reducing the wage-
bill for the corporation. I think a case could be made that TQC inspired
greater ambivalence among Alcoa workers because it was a relative surplus
value issue, and as such, a less clear cut matter than the rotating shift. After
all, it is far more possible to assign a money value to the losses that were
imposed upon workers by the generalized application of the drop shift
throughout the plant. For workers, the implications of the TQC system, and
indeed, it might be argued, of any other relative surplus value strategy,
would be much harder to read. As a result, collective worker response to
new relative surplus value strategies may not always be as clearly hostile as
it has historically tended to be towards new programmes for increasing
absolute surplus value. Thus it is that the seemingly abstract analytical cat-
egories of Capital may play a direct role in advancing our understandings
of worker consciousness.
This may well be a rather more fruitful expectation of Marxian theor-
etical constructs than it is to look to them for predictions regarding the
actual historical twists and bends of the capitalist mode of production. Marx
was convinced, for instance, that absolute surplus value, which consists of
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more or less naked exploitation, would soon have to give way to relative
surplus value. However, absolute surplus value is once again available to
capital at the end of the 20th century: it is characteristic of flexible accumu-
lation that it recombines absolute and relative surplus value strategies for
procuring profit (Harvey, 1989).
Many accounts of the history of changes in workplace control tend to
see the history of the transformations of the labour process as somehow sep-
arate from the dynamic of the capitalist mode of production (Turchetto,
1991). Without a theory of capitalist crisis to propel them forward, such his-
torical narratives tend to remain descriptive at best, or else they slide into
other forms of causal explanation to account for successive forms of labour
control. The most common explanation offered by Alcoa workers for the
changes that they have seen over the course of their working lives is a
descriptive, even fatalistic one: that the pendulum of history has just swung
the other way. Thus:
If everybody do their fair share, the company will still take advantage of the
whole thing, so you need the union there to balance it out. But you can’t
balance too far either. I’d say one time the union probably went too far, they
had too much control. But now the company got too much control.
A line of explanation that is often adopted by default, Turchetto main-
tains, is an easy kind of techno-determinism, which sees each new form of
workplace control as being associated with changes in productive tech-
nology. The Alcoa workers’ discussion of the drop shift seems to suggest
that even at a given level of technology, it is still possible for producers to
use a new workplace control technique to expand absolute surplus value.
Both the change in shift patterns, and the adoption of Total Quality Control
(which is, on the other hand, associated with technological change, viz.
those developments that have made just-in-time production possible) are
best understood in the context of the transitions that capitalism is under-
going, within the United States and elsewhere.
As these findings demonstrate, there is a clear political and theoreti-
cal need to make sense of the directions taken by late 20th-century capital-
ism. A somewhat acrimonious debate has recently broken out over whether
or not we are living in a time of epochal change, and whether or not
’globalization’ represents an entirely new phenomenon (Du Boff and
Herman, 1997; Henwood, 1997; Piven and Cloward, 1998a, 1998b; Sivanan-
dan, 1997; Tabb, 1997a, 1997b; Wood, 1996, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c, 1998).
Those who view ’globalization’ as an alarming new epoch of capitalism are
sometimes apt to take recourse to straightforward determinisms. Thus A.
Sivanandan writes, ’If &dquo;the handmill gives you society with the feudal lord
and the steam mill gives you society with the industrial capitalist&dquo;, the
microchip gives you society with the global capitalist’ (Sivanandan, 1997:
20).
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This argument has been vigorously attacked by analysts who subscribe
to the so-called ’Monthly Reviezu position’ (Piven and Cloward, 1998a: 11).
William Tabb, for example, contests the very idea of ’globalization’ by
quoting a passage from The Communist Manifesto, which describes very
similar processes in the capitalism of 150 years ago:
The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world-market given a
cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country ...
In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have
intercourse in every direction, universal interdependence of nations ... In a
word, it creates a world after its own image. (cited in Tabb, 1997a: 23)
Doug Henwood makes a similar point:
Capitalism is fundamentally still the same beast that Ricardo and Marx
described - a rudely expansive, ceaselessly innovative system (whose inno-
vations are only of the sort that increase profits, it must be noted), and one
based on a fundamental hostility of the classes and a brutally destructive appro-
priation of nature. The detailed realizations of those fundamental principles
vary over time and space, but the fundamentals are still with us. (Henwood,
1997: 30)
These writers explain their hostility to the notion of ’globalization’ by
pointing to the demoralizing consequences for labour organizing in the
United States of an exaggerated notion of capital flight from this country.
The discussions over TQC at the Alcoa plant certainly seem to bear this out.
There is no denying that the American labour movement would behave
very differently if it believed that international trade and capital movements
have not, in fact, massively altered the competitive situation for American
corporations.5 At the same time, it is also necessary - strategically as much
as theoretically - to discuss the particularities of the phase of flexible
accumulation. For instance, an industrial strike becomes a much stronger
weapon in the era of just-in-time production (Parker and Slaughter, 1988).
Since there are not inventories to cushion the company against losses, it
becomes easier for striking unions to negotiate a favourable settlement
more quickly. By focusing exclusively on the continuities in capitalism over
the decades, however, the Monthly Reviezu approach runs the risk of over-
looking significant new concatenations of change. As of this writing, Wood,
Henwood and Tabb have largely refrained from addressing the issue of the
distinctiveness of present-day capitalism.
The theoretical armature that has been assembled around these
workers’ accounts - absolute and relative surplus value, technological shifts
or lack thereof - is not meant to make a case for or against epochal change.
What the description of the combination of absolute and relative surplus
strategies and their impact on these industrial workers might do is to
remind us that there is much that is new and much that is familiar about




The ethnographic data used here derives from fieldwork which was carried out in
southern Indiana between 1989 and 1991 primarily with the help of a grant from
the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research. I would like to thank
Ida Susser, William Roseberry and Dermot Dix for their careful reading of drafts of
this article.
1 A suggestive line of speculation, &agrave; la E.P. Thompson, opened up by some of
these interviews (but not pursued here) regards the manner of internalization
of the newly fashioned mode of time-discipline that is entailed by this change
in work shifts (Thompson, 1993).
2 According to Marx, the working day is composed of two components: necessary
labour time, which is the amount of work that needs to be done to create
enough value to ensure working-class reproduction, and surplus labour time,
which is the work done over and above necessary labour time that translates
into profit for the capitalist. ’I call that surplus-value which is produced by the
lengthening of the working day, absolute surplus-value. In contrast to this, I call
that surplus-value which arises from the curtailment of the necessary labour-
time, and from the corresponding alteration in the respective lengths of the
two components of the working day, relative surplus-value’ (Marx, 1977: 432).
Capital will try to increase absolute surplus value by increasing the number of
hours of work or by reducing wages, while relative surplus value may be
increased by undertaking measures to increase labour productivity.
3 It is a useful first step to disentangle the superficially similar and often conflated
approaches to industrial change of this variety, viz. flexible specialization, regu-
lation theory and other variants of post-Fordism (Hirst and Zeitlin, 1991).
4 Consider the following passage, for instance, taken from a quarterly publication
produced by the Public Relations department at this plant: ’we’ve seen and
heard about Japanese companies that not only produce flawless products, but
can rapidly adapt their production operations to sudden changes in the needs
of customers. These companies do this not with robots, or by massive retrofitting
of their plants. The Japanese are able to ride the sea changes of the marketplace
because as a people, they have fully committed themselves - from the executive
suite to the shop floor - to the continuous improvement of their processes. In
other words, they’ve succeeded at creating a complete TQC culture.
’We are working to bring about the same kind of cultural change at Warrick
and throughout Alcoa. The world we’re entering, as we begin our second
century, is characterized by intense competition and rapid change. We must
meet the challenge of this new world through a constant effort to improve our
processes’ (Public Relations, Alcoa, 1989: 27).
5 There has been a steady build-up of evidence over the last few years that indicates
that the dimensions of capital flight and market shrinkage due to external
competition in the United States have been greatly overestimated in mainstream
accounts (Gordon, 1988; Hirst and Thompson, 1996; Zevin, 1992). The Monthly
Review debate has, of course, further expanded this body of evidence.
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